Brief history of the Battle of Leros

The Battle of Leros (Greek: Μάχη της Λέρου) was the central event of the Dodecanese Campaign of the Second World War.(READ MORE)

The Battle of Leros and the Italian Coastal Batteries (Postazione Lero PL)

THE BATTLE OF LEROS AND THE ITALIAN COASTAL BATTERIES

By Nicholas Kampouras

Map of Leros

In May 2012 was the 100^th anniversary of the conquest of the Dodecanese Islands by the Italians. In November 2013 will be the 70^th anniversary of the Battle of Leros, the main event (operation Taiffun) of the Dodecanese campaign during World War II.

On 13 May 1912, in the course of the Libyan war, the Italians captured a small and insignificant island named Leros, which was part of the Ottoman Empire. Leros belongs to the Dodecanese islands. On 16 November 1943 the Germans, during Dodecanese campaign, invaded Leros, the biggest Italian aero-naval base in the south-east Mediterranean Sea at that time.

On 13 May 1912 twenty two Turkish soldiers, the garrison of Leros, surrendered to a detachment of Italian sailors. On 16 November 1943 the British Brigadier R. Tilney, the Italian Rear Admiral L. Macherpa and the troops under their command- 8,000 men according to the Greek newspaper “KATHIMERINI” (Athens 18/11/1943)- surrendered to the German General Müller, giving an end to the battle of Leros. 

Today in the British Military Cemetery, in Alinda, there are the graves of 187 British. M. Samarcos in his book “Leros the Malta of the Aegean Sea” says that after the battle, the locals counted 318 dead Germans. The History Department of the Italian Navy in its book “The History of the Italian Navy” reports 72 dead navy men and 164 missing in action.

The difference between the above mentioned events is eloquent. The first one, which marked the beginning of the Italian presence in the south-east Aegean Sea, was a peaceful settlement. The latter, which signaled the end of the Italian Era in the region, was bloodshed.

A poster of the fascist Italian

 Ministry of Education.  The motto

 “MARE NOSTRUM” expresses

 the doctrine of the fascist regime’s

 foreign policy.

The question that arises is not: “How much accurate are the numbers of the casualties?” or “Could Brigadier R. Tilney had done something better?” The question is: “What happened during those 31 years and Leros were worth so many human lives?” The answer lies in Leros’ strategic position, its geographical features and in “Mare Nostrum” (=our sea), the Italian foreign policy doctrine, or better saying the ambition of the Italian fascist regime to convert the Mediterranean Sea into an Italian lake.      

Leros is a small island, its maximum length is 15 kilometers and its maximum width is 5.6 kilometers. Deep cuts break up the coast line forming narrow bays that are natural ports. No matter which direction the wind blows, there is always a safe port in Leros. . The island is covered by hills. There are also the so-called mountains, which are heights with steep rocky slopes. The highest is the mount Scumbarda (327 m), in the south-east part, followed by the mount Clidi (320 m) in the north. In the central part, Rachi ridge (103 m) runs from north to south along the isthmus that is formed between Gurna bay and Alinda bay. There is no space for runways, so Leros cannot be converted into an aircraft carrier. 

Never the less is a natural fort. All the bays are commanded by heights, which are magnificent places for coastal defense artillery. Extremely few beaches lent themselves to daring landing operations, given the fact that they are under crossfire by the nearby coastal batteries. Any attempt to perform airborne operations on this rocky ground, full of steep hills and heights, must count on a very good luck. 

On the hillside opposite to the water front were builded the barracks of the coastal battery. Close to them there was an underground bomb shelter. It was a tunnel drilled in the rocks of the slope.

The end of the Great War left Italy on the side of the victors, but on the border line between great and small powers. It was not what Italy was expected. Although Russia and Germany had suffered a setback, with the exception of Austria-Hungary, the major powers in Europe were still the same since 1871. The Paris Peace Conference created a resentful mood and a feeling for revenge against the former allies.

The barracks of the battery PL 388 

builded in a recess on the slope 

of mount Tsigunas.

The Italian Fascist Party which came to power in 1922, aimed to restore Italy’s pride and prestige. The Roman Empire had to be revived. Because Italy is wholly a Mediterranean country the Mediterranean Sea and the surrounding lands are of a paramount importance. Gibraltar, Malta and Egypt were all under British administration. If Italy had to challenge the status quo in the region she had to secure a strong military presence in the south-east part of the Mediterranean Sea.
L. M. Gander in his book “Long road to Leros” says that the British Headquarters in Cairo regarded Leros “…in the military view, Leros was a natural fortress…” This was clear to the Italians from the very first moment they stepped on it. They spend twenty four years in fortifying Leros as a naval base. The military works comprised the building of coastal fortifications on the heights of the coast line and the construction of military infrastructures (workshops, warehouses, magazines barracks etc). The works for the defense positions started in 1912 and finished in 1930. The construction of the infrastructures commenced in 1924 and concluded in 1936. Virgilio Spigai, the commanding officer of the Italian Naval Artillery in Leros, in his book “LERO (RIPOSTA AL SIGNOR C.S. FORESTER)” accounts five coastal batteries, 17 dual purpose (coastal and antiaircraft) batteries and three antiaircraft batteries. The total account of guns was 11 guns of 152mm, 9 guns of 102mm, 6 guns of 90mm and 58 guns of 76mm.

The observation-fire control
 post of the battery
PL 227 in Katsuni.

The fortified positions were composed by three or four open circular gun pits, underground ammunition magazines (two for every gun pit), usually one observation-fire control post, barracks, officers accommodation and administration facilities. The gun pits were positioned on the summits of the heights. For having all the heights sharply-pointed mountaintops, there was no room even for a small circular slab of four meters diameter. In order to get the available space for both the gun pits and the magazines, earth works had to be done. On lower levels and on the hillside opposite to the water front the engineers created artificial recesses by blasting off the slopes. There they builded the barracks and the other facilities hidden from the gun sights of the enemy vessels.

The British General Staff in the Middle East regarded the Italian defense positions as very powerful on paper and obsolete in practice. They estimated that besides the impressive total number of guns and the wide range of calibers, the fire power was highly ineffective because the majority of the guns were of old pattern with antiquated sight gears. Also they were lacking any form of modern fire control instruments. Furthermore, the fact that the gun emplacements were in the open, rated the positions highly vulnerable to air raids.

The Germans failed to knock out
 the batteries because the lower
the bomb explodes on a steep slope
 the lesser the effects
of the blast wave on the top.

Taking in account the level of military technology in 1943 the British estimation was correct. A quick comparison between the German coastal fortifications of the “Atlantic Wall” and Leros onshore defenses confirms the above assessment. On 29 November 1948 during the session of the Italian Parliament, the MP Amadei Leonetto reported that from the twenty one antiaircraft and dual purpose batteries only one was equipped with modern guns 90/53 and that the majority of the ammunition was of a second class quality.
The Italians started the construction of the fixed defenses in 1912. At those times an island-naval base might be subjected to two classes of hostile actions: landing operations and naval attacks by armored or unarmored vessels. The arm of the aviation was an unknown word in the warfare’s vocabulary. 
In 1916 F.W. Lanchester published his book “Aircraft in Warfare the dawn of the forth arm”. The preface of this book was written by Maj.-Gen. Sir David Henderson, K.C.B. He starts the preface writing “The subject of Aircraft in Warfare, with which Mr. Lanchester deals, is and for some time will be highly controversial. In each of its three aspects, the scientific, the military and the material or manufacturing, it is still in the stage of experiment and speculation”.
From all the above mentioned there is no doubt that the Italian Army Engineers did the right thing. There was no need for bunkers and the gun pits had to be open. Never the less the evolution of the Art of War was very quick and in 1943 the aviation was not just the forth arm but the master arm. Consequently any kind of gun emplacement in the open was obsolete and useless. Does it mean that Leros coastal defenses had nothing to offer? The historical facts tell a different story. 

One of the tunnels the Italians
used as arsenals and bomb shelters
in Merikia.

Germans bombed Leros ruthlessly and incessantly for 54 days before the battle brake out and for 4 days during the battle. Peter Schenk in his book “Kampf um die Ägäis” reports that during these 54 days 984 air raids took place and 1,096 tons of bombs were dropped. Despite all this heavy bombing the Germans failed miserably to knock out the coastal batteries. At dawn on 12 November 1943 the D day of the operation “Taiffun” from a total of 59 guns of the thirteen more important batteries 37 were in service.
The Germans paid the toll. Their efforts to approach and land at the western part of the island (Gurna bay) failed under the dense, intense and accurate fire of the coastal artillery The Western Task Force (Westgruppe) was driven back. Respectively in the east part of the island the Eastern Task Force (Ostgruppe) failed in all its attempts to land at Blefutis bay. The Germans regrouped in the open sea and under a smoke screen three contingents landed at respective points with sheer cliffs and out of the range of the batteries.
Mission accomplished or mission failed for the coastal defenses? On the one hand no German soldier step on the island at any beach within the range of the guns of the coastal artillery. On the other hand the Germans captured the island. Did the bastions fail to safeguard the fortress?

The supporting base and the shield
of a machine-gun in Blefutis bay.

Capturing or not Leros was an issue of strategy. Brigadier R. Tilney devised a defensive plan according to the military manuals. The Basic Field Manual (FM 31-10) of the U.S. Army entitled COSTAL DEFENSE and issued on 12 July 1941, in the page describing the scope of the publication says: “…In the preparation for and the execution of coast defense, the basic consideration for the defending force is the defeat and destruction of the invading force before it lands or while it is attempting to gain a foothold on the beach…” And that was exactly what Brig. R. Tilney did.  He planned to keep the enemy off the beaches in the bays by all means. His defensive plan was “by the book” therefore could confront an attack made “by the book”. In simple words, in this plan there was no room for “the unexpected”.
General Müller proved himself a very good scholar of history. He identified his tactical situation and he based his plan on similar historical facts. He was very well aware that he was the invader and his troops were in numerical inferiority than the adversaries. What could be the proper action? He had to act in the same way as Alexander the Great did in the Battle of Gaugamela or Hernán Cortés in Tenochtitlan, in other words to target the enemy leader. Thus he devised a plan to capture the British HQ on the island and not the island. The Germans knew the exact location of Brig. R. Tilney’s HQ. 

 Non Commissioned Officers’ Mess
 of the Coastal Battery  PL 388.
 On one of the walls an unknown
 artist painted a copy of
Pieter Bruegel’s “The Peasant Wedding”

M. Samarcos an eye witness of the battle and member of the Greek resistance on the island, in his book “Leros the Malta of the Aegean Sea” say that among the Italian technicians in the naval base of Porto Lago there were a lot of fascists, so the existence of sympathizers and informers is highly probable. Following the popular-among the German generals-Napoleonic tactic "on s'engage partout et puis on voit" (engage the enemy everywhere, and then decide what to do), he planned as many landings at the beaches as his troops could do. But what really gave him the victory was “the unexpected” part of his plan. Unexpectedly German assault groups landed at points of the shoreline with sheer cliffs and scaled vertical walls of rocks before they capture defense positions. Unexpectedly German paratroopers landed at rocky drop zone where a normal person finds it difficult to walk. The German plan was the perfect and absolute application of the trilogy “know the enemy, know the battlefield, do the unexpected”.     

 In November 1939 General Kirke, Commander in Chief of the British Home Forces, issued the “J. C. Plan”. In this plan a systematic strategy of the British national coast defense was laid down. The “J. C. Plan” placed great emphasis on the defeat of enemy airborne troops in the belief that if any paratroop landing could be contained, then a general invasion attempt would fail. It is of the funny games of history that the British, who established the correlation between the airborne and beach landing operations, missed this point in Leros.

Today Leros is probably the biggest open WW II museum in the world. The Italian coastal batteries still stand in a good condition, despite of the moist, salty, windy environment and the indifference of the local population, telling the story of a whole era and paying a tribute-more than hundred years later (1912-2013)-to the engineers, technicians and workers who builded them.   

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